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Social Security and Inequality
over the Life Cycle
Angus Deaton, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas,
and Christina Paxson
4.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the consequences of Social Security reform for
the inequality of consumption across individuals. The basic idea is that
inequality is at least in part the consequence of individual risk in earnings
or asset returns. In each period, each person gets a diﬀerent draw, of earn-
ings or of asset returns, so that whenever diﬀerences cumulate over time,
the members of any group will draw further apart from one another, and
inequality will grow. Inequality at a moment of time is the fossilized record
of the history of personal diﬀerences in risky outcomes. Any institution
that shares risk across individuals, the U.S. Social Security system being
the case in point, will moderate the transmission of individual risk into
inequality, and it is this process that we study in this chapter. Note that we
aren ot concerned here with what has been one of the central issues in
Social Security reform, the distribution between diﬀerent generations over
the transition. Instead, we are concerned with the equilibrium eﬀects of
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115diﬀerent Social Security arrangements on inequality among members of
any given generation.
Ac o ncrete and readily analyzed example occurs when the economy is
composed of autarkic permanent income consumers, each of whom has
an uncertain ﬂow of earnings. Each agent’s consumption follows a mar-
tingale (i.e., consumption today equals expected consumption tomorrow),
and is therefore the cumulated sum of martingale diﬀerences, so that if
shocks to earnings are independent over agents, consumption inequality
grows with time for any group with ﬁxed membership. The same is true of
asset and income inequality, although not necessarily of earnings inequal-
ity: see Deaton and Paxson (1994), who also document the actual growth
of income, earnings, and consumption inequality over the life cycle in the
United States and elsewhere. An insurance arrangement that taxes earn-
ings and redistributes the proceeds equally, either in the present or the fu-
ture,reduces the rate at which consumption inequality evolves. With com-
plete insurance, marginal utilities of diﬀerent agents move in lockstep, and
consumption inequality remains constant. Social Security pools risks and
thus limits the growth of life-cycle inequality. Reducing the share of in-
come that is pooled through the Social Security system, as envisaged by
somer eform proposals (such as the establishment of individual accounts
with diﬀerent portfolios or diﬀerent management costs) but not by others
(such as setting up a provident fund with a common portfolio and common
management costs) increases the rate at which consumption and income
inequality evolve over life in a world of permanent-income consumers.
Even if inequality is not inherited from one generation to the next, and
each generation starts afresh, partial privatization of Social Security will
increase average inequality. While much of the discussion about limiting
portfolio choice in new Social Security arrangements has (rightly) focused
on limiting risk, such restrictions will also have eﬀects on inequality.
Provided the reform is structured so that the poor are made no worse
oﬀ,i tc an be argued that the increase in inequality is of no concern (see,
e.g., Feldstein 1998), so that our analysis would be of purely academic
interest. Nevertheless, the fact remains that many people—perhaps mis-
taking inequality for poverty—ﬁnd inequality objectionable, so that it is
as well to be aware of the fact if it is the case that an increase in inequality
is likely to be an outcome of Social Security reform. There are also instru-
mental reasons for being concerned about inequality; both theoretical and
empirical studies implicate inequality in other socially undesirable out-
comes, such as low investment in public goods, lower economic growth,
and even poor health (Wilkinson 1996).
Thep aper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 works entirely within the
framework of the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). We derive the for-
mulas that govern the spread of consumption inequality, and show how
inequality is modiﬁed by the introduction of a stylized Social Security
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and Paxson (1994), which should be consulted for more details, reﬁne-
ments, and reservations, as well as for documentation that consumption
inequality grows over the life cycle, not only in the United States, but at
much the same rate in Britain and Taiwan. The PIH is convenient because
it permits closed-form solutions that show explicitly how Social Security
is related to inequality. However, it is not a very realistic model of actual
consumption in the United States, and it embodies assumptions that are
far from obviously appropriate for Social Security analysis—for example,
that consumers have unlimited access to credit, and that intertemporal
transfers leaving the present value of lifetime resources unchanged have
no eﬀecto nc o nsumption. In consequence, in section 4.3, we consider
richer models of consumption and saving that incorporate both precau-
tionary motivesf or saving and borrowing restrictions. These models help
replicate what we see in the data, which is the tendency of consumers to
switch endogenously from buﬀer-stock behavior early in life to life-cycle
savingb ehavior in middlea ge.T he presence of the precautionary motive
and the borrowing constraints breaks the link between consumption and
the present value of lifetime resources, which both complicates and en-
riches the analysis of Social Security. Legal restrictions prevent the use of
Social Security as a collateral for loans, and for at least some people such
restrictions are likely to be binding.
Solutions to models with precautionary motives and borrowing con-
straints are used to document how Social Security systems with diﬀering
degrees of risk sharing aﬀect inequality. We ﬁrst consider the case in which
all consumers receive the same rate of return on their assets. Our results
indicate that systems in which there is less sharing of earnings risk—such
as systems of individual accounts—produce higher consumption inequal-
ityb othb efore and after retirement. An important related issue is whether
diﬀerences across consumers in rates of return will contribute to even
greater inequality. Somewhat surprisingly, we ﬁnd that allowing for fairly
substantial diﬀerences in rates of return across consumers has only modest
additional eﬀects on inequality. The bulk of saving, in the form of both
Social Security and non–Social Security assets, is done late enough in life
so that diﬀerences in rates of return do not contribute much to consump-
tion inequality.
4.2 Social Security and Inequality under
the Permanent Income Hypothesis
Section 4.2.1 introduces the notation and basic algebra of the perma-
nent income hypothesis, while section 4.2.2 reproduces from Deaton and
Paxson (1994) the basic result on the spread of consumption and income
inequality over the life cycle. Both subsections are preliminary to the main
Social Security and Inequality over the Life Cycle 117analysis. Section 4.2.3 introduces a simpliﬁed Social Security system in an
inﬁnite horizon model with PIH consumers and shows how a Social Secu-
rity tax at rate  reduces the rate of spread of consumption inequality by
the factor (1  )2.S ection 4.2.4 discusses what happens when there is a
maximum to the Social Security tax, and section 4.2.5 extends the model
to deal with ﬁnite lives and retirement and shows that the basic result
is unaﬀected.
4.2.1 Preliminaries: Notation and the Permanent Income Hypothesis
It is useful to begin with the algebra of the PIH; the notation is taken
from Deaton (1992). Real earnings at time t are denoted yt.I ndividual
consumption is ct and assets At;w hen it is necessary to do so we shall
introduce an i suﬃxt od enotei ndividuals. There is a constant real rate of
interest r.T hese magnitudes are linked by the accumulation identity
(1) Ar A y c tt t t =+ + − −− − () ( ) . 1 11 1
Under certainty equivalence, with rate of time preference equal to r,a n d
an inﬁnite horizon, consumption satisﬁes the PIH rule, and is equal to the

















for expectation operator Et,c onditional on information available at time t.
It is convenient to begin with the inﬁnite horizon case; we deal with the
ﬁnite horizon case in section 4.2.5.
































which enables us to rewrite the PIH rule in equation (2) in the equivalent













118 Angus Deaton, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and Christina PaxsonAssets are linked to saving through the identity (implied by equations [1]
and [5]):
(7) Ar s tt =+ − () 1 1
Finally, it is convenient to specify a stochastic process for earnings, yt.I t
is convenient to do this by assuming that
(8)   () ( ) () Ly L tt −= ε
for lag operator L and polynomials (L)a n d(L)a n dw h ite noise εt.A s
written, and under the usual conditions on the roots, earnings is stationary
(around )a nd invertible. In fact, we can allow a unit root in (L)w i t h
essentially no modiﬁcation. (In the more realistic models in section 4.3, we
will work with a process with a unit root but speciﬁed in logarithms.)




























so that consumption is a random walk and the innovation variance of
consumption is tied to the innovation variance of earnings by the autocor-
relation properties of the latter.
4.2.2 Spreading Inequality
Begin with the simplest illustrative case, in which earnings are white
noise, and add an i suﬃxf or an individual
(10) yw z it i it i t it =+=++  ε ,
where i is the individual-speciﬁc mean of earnings, wt isac o m m o n
(macro) component, and zit is an idiosyncratic component. The macro
component wt is also independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over
time. Given equation (10), equation (3) implies
(11) cc r
r




As a result, if the idiosyncratic components are orthogonal to lagged con-
sumption in the cross-section (which need not be true in each year but is
true on the average by the martingale property), the cross-sectional vari-
ance of consumption satisﬁes





























so that consumption inequality is increasing over time.
Note that although equation (12) is derived for the variance of consump-
tion, the increase in consumption variance is general, not speciﬁc to a
particular measure of inequality. According to equation (11), the house-
hold distribution of consumption at t is the distribution of consumption at
t  1 plus uncorrelated white noise. Given that the mean is not changing,
the addition of noise implies that the distribution of consumption at t is
second-order stochastically dominated by the distribution of consumption
at t  1, so that any transfer-respecting measure of inequality, such as the
Gini coeﬃcient, the Theil inequality measure, or the coeﬃcient of varia-
tion (but not necessarily the variance in logarithms), will show an increase
of inequality over time.










(14) AA it it it =+ −− 11 ε .
Because disposable income is the sum of consumption and saving, the





















































Because the consumption variance is spreading, and because saving is sta-
tionaryb ye quation (13), disposable income variance must spread at the
same rate as the consumption variance. Note that earnings variance is con-
stant given the stationarity assumption in equation (10), so that
(17) var constant tz y =+=  
22 .
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(18) var var tz AA t () () . =+ 0
2 
Ther ateo fspread of the variance of assets is the variance of the idiosyn-
cratic component of the innovation of earnings. At a real interest rate of 5
percent, this is 400 times faster than the rate of spread of the variance of
consumption and of disposable income. From any given starting point,
asset inequality amongag roupo fi ndividuals grows much faster than does
consumption or disposable income inequality.
In the United States, the data on consumption, earnings, and income
arec onsistent with the predictions of the theory. Deaton and Paxson
(1994) use repeated cross-sections from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) to trace birth cohorts through the successive surveys, and ﬁnd that
cross-sectional consumption inequality for any given birth cohort increases
with the age of the cohort. For example, the Gini coeﬃcientf or family
consumption (family income) increases (on average over all cohorts) from
0.28 (0.42) at age twenty-ﬁve to about 0.38 (0.62) at age ﬁfty-ﬁve. We shall
return to these ﬁndings in section 4.3.
4.2.3 Social Security and the Spread of Inequality
Suppose that the government enacts a simple Social Security system. A
proportionate tax on earnings is levied at rate ,a nd the revenues are di-
vided equally and given to everyone. We think about the (partial) reversal
of this process as a stylized version of reform proposals that pays some
part of each individual’s Social Security tax into personal saving accounts;
the precise mechanisms will be presented in section 4.3.2. We recognize
that the establishment of personal accounts has other eﬀects, some of
whicha re notc a ptured under our simple assumptions. Our concern here,
however, is with the reduction in the pooling or risk sharing that is implied
by removing a part of Social Security tax proceeds from the common pool
and placing it in individual accounts. Such accounts provide smoothing
beneﬁts for autarkic agents who would not or cannot save on their own
account, but they reduce the risk-sharing elements of the current system
unless they are supplemented by other speciﬁcally risk-sharing features
such as transfers from successful to unsuccessful investors.
Because of the inﬁnite horizon and certainty equivalence assumptions,
dividing up the revenues and returning them immediately is the same as
giving them back later. The model assumes no deadweight loss. Denote
before-tax earnings as y b
it and retain the notation yit fora f ter-tax income,
(1  )y b
it.I nthe i.i.d. case we have
(19) yit i it =− + + () ( ) , 1    ε
where the last term is the average revenue of the tax, which isg iven back
to everyone. Equation (19) can also be written as
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Compared with the original earnings process in equation (10), there is a
shift toward the grand mean—the redistributional eﬀect of the Social Se-
curity system—together with a scaling of the innovation by 1  ,w h i ch
is the risk-sharing component of the Social Security system. The redistri-
bution will change consumption levels for everyone not at the mean, but
will not aﬀect the innovation of consumption equation (11), saving equa-
tion (13), asset equation (14), or disposable income equation (15), except
that the original innovation must be rescaled by 1  .I nc o n s e quence,
the variances of consumption, disposable income, and assets all evolve as
before, but at a rate that is (1  )2 times the original rate. If the Social
Security tax is 12.4 percent, inequality (measured by the variance) will
spread at 76.7 percent of the rate that it would in the absence of the sys-
tem. Imagine an economy in equilibrium, with no inheritance of inequality
and no growth in lifetime resources, so that the cross-sectional proﬁle of
consumption by age is identical to the lifetime proﬁle of consumption for
each cohort, and all consumption inequality is within-cohort inequality.
With a working life of forty years and consumption variance originally
growing at 5 percent, the imposition of a Social Security tax at 12.4 per-
cent will reduce the cross-sectional standard deviation of consumption by
a factor of 5.
In equations (19) and (20), we have not explicitly distinguished the
macro common component of the innovation wt from the idiosyncratic
component εit.I fw esubstitute to make the decomposition explicit, equa-
tion (20) becomes
(21) yz w it i i it t =− −+ − +    () ( ) , 1
which shows that the common component is not insured. The change in
consumption warranted by equation (21) is
(22) c r
r
wz it t it =
+
+− [] 1
1 () , 
but only the second term in the brackets contributes to the spread in con-
sumption variance, and the results are as stated previously.
4.2.4 Social Security with a Maximum
The PIH is not well suited to modeling a Social Security system in which
taxes are paid only up to the Social Security maximum. The nonlinearity
complicates the forecasting equations for earnings and eliminates the ana-
lytical tractability that is the main attraction of the formulation. However,
in the spirit of a system with a maximum, it is worth noting what happens
when there are two classes of people, one whose earnings never rise above
122 Angus Deaton, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and Christina Paxsonthe Social Security maximum, and one whose earnings never drop below
the Social Security maximum. Equation (20) still gives after-tax income
for the poor group, and inequality among them spreads as in the previous
section. For the rich group, after-tax income is
(23) ym
m
it i it i it =− + + + −
+
+









where m is the Social Security maximum, 1 is mean earnings of the poorer
group, and we have assumed that there are equal numbers in the two
groups. (The ﬁrst term is what is left if tax was paid on everything, the
second term is the rebate of tax above the maximum, and the last term is
the shared beneﬁt.) Equation (23) can be rewritten as
(24) y
m








which makes the straightforward point that those above the maximum
no longer participate in the risk sharing, only in the redistribution. As a
result, the Social Security system with the two groups will limit the rate
of spread of inequality among the poorer group, but not among the richer
group, although it will bring the two groups closer together than they
would have been in the absence of the system.
4.2.5 Finite Lives with Retirement
With ﬁnitely lived consumers we can have a more realistic Social Secu-
rity system, in which the taxes are repaid in retirement rather than instan-
taneously. One point to note about retirement is that it induces a fall in
earnings at the time of retirement, a fall that enters into the determination
of saving (see equation [6]). When there is a unit root in earnings, earnings
immediately prior to retirement have a unit root, and so does the drop in
earnings at retirement. In consequence, saving, which must cover this drop
in earnings, is no longer stationary but integrated of order one, so that
assets, which are cumulated saving, are integrated of order two. The spread
of inequality in assets is therefore an order of integration faster than the
spread of inequality in consumption and disposable income. However, this
seems more a matter of degree than an essential diﬀerence.
People work until age R and die at age T.T he consumption innovation
formula is only slightly diﬀerent:
(25)  tt t
k
Rt
k tt t k c r
rr











where the annuity factor t is given by



















Hence, in the i.i.d. case previously considered,































With a uniform distribution of ages, the beneﬁts while retired in year









With certainty equivalence, only the expected presentv alue of this matters
(which is a constant given the i.i.d. assumption) so that, once again, al-
though the levels of consumption are altered, there is no change to the
innovation of consumption, nor to the rate at which the various inequali-
ties spread.
These results would clearly be diﬀerent with either an autocorrelation
structure of the macro component of earnings such that current innova-
tionsh ad information about what will happen in retirement, although this
issue seems hardly worth worrying about; or precautionary motives or bor-
rowing restrictions, such that transactions thatl eave net present value
unaﬀected can have real eﬀects on the level and proﬁle of consumption.
Without quadratic preferences, and without the ability to borrow, we can-
not even guarantee the basic result that uncertainty in earnings causes
consumption and income inequality to increase with age. In consequence,
we have little choice but to specify a model and to simulate the eﬀects of
alternative Social Security policies, and this is the topic of section 4.3. Of
course, it might reasonably be argued that the purpose of Social Security
is not well captured within any of these models, and that present-value
neutral “forced” saving has real eﬀects, not because of precautionary mo-
tiveso rb orrowing restrictions, but because people are myopic or otherwise
unable to make sensible retirement plans on their own. We are sympathetic
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outamore explicit model of behavior, it is not possible to conclude any-
thing about the eﬀects of Social Security reform on inequality.
4.3 Social Security with Precautionary Saving or Borrowing Constraints
4.3.1 Describing the Social Security System
When consumers cannot borrow, or when they have precautionary mo-
tivesf or saving, the timing of income aﬀects their behavior. In conse-
quence, wen eed to be more precisea b o ut the speciﬁcation of the Social
Security system and its ﬁnancing. We assume that there is a constant rate
of Social Security tax on earnings during the working life, levied at rate ,
and that during retirement, the system pays a two-part beneﬁt. The ﬁrst
part, G,i sag u a r a n t eed ﬂoor that is paid to everyone, irrespective of their
earnings or contribution record. The second part, Vi,i si ndividual-speciﬁc
and depends on the present value of earnings (or contributions) over the
working life. We write Si for the annual payment to individual i after retire-
ment, so that
































 ˜/(1  ). The size of the parameter  determines the extent of
the link between earnings in work and Social Security payments in retire-
ment. When we consider the eﬀects of diﬀerent Social Security systems on
inequality, we shall consider variations in  and G while holding the tax
rate  constant. As we shall see below, this is equivalent to devoting a larger
or smaller share of Social Security tax revenues to individual accounts.
When  is high relative to G (personal saving accounts), the system is rel-
atively autarkic, and there is relatively little sharing of risk. Conversely,
when G is large and  small (the current system), risk sharing is more
important, and we expect inequality to be lower.
Theg overnment ﬁnances the Social Security system in such a way as to
balance the budget in present-value terms within each cohort. If we use
the date of retirement as the base for discounting, the present value of
government revenues from the Social Security taxes levied on the cohort
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Social Security and Inequality over the Life Cycle 125where N is the number of people and Yt is aggregate before-tax earnings
for the cohort in year t.T his must equal the present value at R of Social
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The budget constraint that revenues equal outlays, that equation (32)
equals equation (33), gives a relationship between the three parameters of





























Equation (34) tells us that we can choose any two of the three parameters,
G,  (or  ˜), and ,a nd what is implied for the third. It also makes clear
that, after appropriate scaling, and holding the guarantee ﬁxed, increases
in —the earnings-related or autarkic part of the system—are equivalent
to increases in the rate of the Social Security tax, given that the govern-
ment is maintaining within-cohort budget balance.
The link between earnings-related Social Security payments and indi-
vidual accounts can be seen more clearly if we reparameterize the system.
Suppose that Vi, the earnings-related component of the Social Security
payment, is funded out of a fraction of Social Security taxes set aside for
the purpose, or equivalently, that a fraction  of the tax is used to build a
personal account, the value of which is used to buy an annuity at retire-
ment. Equating the present value of each annuity Vi to the present value












Hence, any increase in the earnings-related component of Social Security
through an increase in  (or  ˜)c an be thought of as an increase in the
fraction of Social Security taxes sequestered into personal accounts. Equa-
tion (34), which constrains the parameters of the Social Security system,
can ber ewritten in terms of  as
(37) G y
r jR






































so that each person’s Social Security beneﬁts are related to a weighted
average of their own lifetime earnings and the average lifetime earnings of
their entire cohort.
If the above scheme were implemented for permanent-income consum-
ers who are allowed to borrow and lend at will, the component of Social
Security taxes that goes into personal accounts would have no eﬀect on
individual consumption nor, therefore, on its distribution across individu-
als. Although the scheme forces people to save, it is fair in present value
terms, and so has no eﬀecto nthe present value of each individual’s life-
time resources. Moreover, although taxes are paid now and beneﬁts re-
ceivedl a ter, such a transfer can be undone by appropriate borrowing and
lending. If the Social Security tax rate is ,a n daf r a c t i o n is invested in
ap ersonal account, it is as if the tax rate were reduced to (1  ), and
the rate of increase in the consumption and income variance will be higher.
Of course, none of these results hold if consumers are not allowed to bor-
row,o ri fp references are other than quadratic.
4.3.2 Modeling Consumption Behavior
Although we shall also present results from the permanent income hy-
pothesis, our preferred model is one with precautionary motives based on
that in Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Ludvigson and Paxson (2001),
with the addition of retirement and a simple Social Security system. The
speciﬁcation and parameters are chosen to provide a reasonable approxi-
mation to actual behavior so that, even though it is not possible to derive
closed-form solutions for the results, we can use simulations to give us
some idea of the eﬀects of the reforms.
Consumers have intertemporally additive isoelastic utility functions
and, as before, they work through years 1 to R  1, retiring in period R
and dying in period T.T h er e al interest rate is ﬁxed, but the rate of time
preference  is (in general) diﬀerent from r,s othat consumers satisfy the
familiar Euler equation






 () ( ) , 1 1
where 
 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and

(1 	 )1.A f ter-tax earnings, where taxes include Social Security
taxes, evolves according to the (also fairly standard) nonstationary process
(40) ln ln yy tt t t =+ + − −− 11  εε ,
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random walk with drift  and white noise transitory earnings. The quantity
 is the parameter of the moving average process for the change in earnings
and is an increasing function of the ratio of the variances of the transitory
and random walk components, respectively. Consumers are assumed to be
unable to borrow, which requires a modiﬁcation of equation (39) (see be-
low). One reason for this assumption is to mimic the United States, where
it is illegal to borrow against prospective Social Security income. A second
reason is to rule out the possibility that people borrow very large sums
early in life to ﬁnance a declining consumption path over the life cycle.
This prohibition could be enforced in other ways, such as the “voluntary”
borrowing constraints in Carroll (1997) that result from isoelastic utility
coupled with a ﬁnite probability of zero earnings. We do not ﬁnd Carroll’s
income process empirically plausible, and it seems simpler to rule out bor-
rowing explicitly rather than to choose the form of the earnings process to
do so. Our calculations for the permanent income case are made with and
without borrowing constraints, which will give some idea of the eﬀects of
the borrowing constraints in the other models.
Our procedure is as follows. Given values for the real interest rate, the
rate of time preference, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the
moving average parameter in income growth, and two out of three parame-
ters of the Social Security system, we calculate a set of policy functions
fore ach year of a forty-year working life. After retirement, there is no
further uncertainty, and consumption can be solved analytically for each
of the twenty years remaining. We assume that the Social Security system
presented in section 4.3.2 has been in place for a long time, that its parame-
ters are ﬁxed, and that people understand how it works, including the gov-
ernment’s intertemporal budget constraint. In particular, they understand
the implications of innovations to their earnings for the value of their an-
nuities in retirement. We do not require consumers to take into account
the eﬀects of successive macroeconomic shocks on the size of the Social
Security guarantee G. Instead, we assume that the government sets G to
the value that satisﬁes the budget constraint in expectation for each cohort,
and that deﬁcits and surpluses from cumulated macro shocks are passed
on to future generations. There are, however, no macro shocks in the simu-
lations reported below.
In each period of the working life, the ratio of consumption to earnings
canb ew ritten as function of three state variables. These are deﬁned as
follows. Deﬁne cash on hand xt 
 At 	 yt,w hich, by equation (1), evolves
during the working life t  R according to
(41) xr x c y tt t t =+ − + −− () ( ). 1 11
During retirement, for t  R,
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If wt is the ratio of cash on hand to earnings, and t the ratio of consump-















where gt is the ratio of current to lagged income, yt/yt1.T oderive corre-
sponding equations for the dynamics of Social Security, deﬁne St as the
current present value of the annual Social Security payment to which the
consumer would be entitled if he or she earned no more income between
year t and retirement. Hence, for t  R,
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while for t  R, St is constant and given by equation (31). Noting that
earnings in year R is zero, equation (44) satisﬁes, for t  R,
(45) Sr S Y tt t =+ + − () 1 1 
and is constant thereafter. If we deﬁne t, the ratio of St to current earnings
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With borrowing constraints, which imply that consumption cannot be
greater than cash on hand, or that the consumption ratio be no larger than
the cash on hand ratio, the Euler equation (39) is modiﬁed to
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We write the consumption ratio t as a function of the cash on hand ratio
wt, the Social Security replacement rate t,a nd the current innovation to
earnings εt (which is required because, with positive ,h ighe a rnings
growth in one period predicts low earnings growth in the next), and then
use equation (47) to solve backward for the policy function in each period,
starting from the closed-form solution for consumption in the ﬁrst year
of retirement.
Armed with the policy functions, we simulate lifetime stochastic earn-
ings proﬁles for each of 1,000 people. The logarithm of initial earnings is
drawn from a normal distribution with mean ln (20,000) and a standard
deviation of 0.65, the latter chosen to give an initial Gini coeﬃcient that
Social Security and Inequality over the Life Cycle 129roughly corresponds to what we see in the data from the CPS. The drift
(expected rate of growth) of earnings is set at 2 percent a year. For any
given value of the replacement parameter  and the Social Security tax
rate , the corresponding value of the Social Security guarantee G is set
from equation (34) using actual realized earnings, which, as we have al-
readyn oted,i sp otentially problematic if macro shocks are important. The
value of G also gives the initial value of t at the beginning of life. The
calculated policy functions are then used to simulate life-cycle consump-
tion fore ach of the 1,000 people, and these trajectories are used to assess
lifetime inequality as a function of the design of the Social Security system.
Diﬀerent simulations use the same 1,000 sets of earnings realizations, so
that comparisons across Social Security regimes reﬂect the regime parame-
ters and not the speciﬁc draws.
4.3.3 Social Security Design and Inequality:
Results with Constant Interest Rates
Them odel is solved under the following assumptions. The interest rate
r is set at 3 percent, and the rate of time preference at either 3 or 5 percent.
Thed rift of the earnings process is set at 2 percent a year, the moving
average parameter  to 0.4, and the standard deviation of the innovation
(in logs) to be 0.25. The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is set to 3, so
that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one-third. We also in-
clude a certainty equivalent case, with and without borrowing restrictions,
in which the rate of interest is set equal to the rate of time preference at 3
percent. There are four cases carried through the analysis: (1) isoelastic
preferences, no borrowing, r 
 0.03, 
0.05; (2) isoelastic preferences,
no borrowing, r 
 0.03, 
0.03; (3) quadratic preferences, no borrowing,
r 
 0.03, 
0.03; and (4), quadratic preferences, borrowing allowed, r 

0.03, 
0.03. The Social Security tax rate is set at its current value of
12.4 percent of before-tax earnings and there are no other taxes or beneﬁts.
The Social Security systems we consider are indexed on the level of the
Social Security guarantee G,w hich takes the values ($0, $5,000, $10,000,
$15,000, $20,000); given the tax rate, these values translate into corre-
sponding values for  or,p erhaps more revealingly, into values for , the
share of the tax devoted to personal accounts (1, 0.811, 0.623, 0.434,
0.245). These diﬀerent sets of parameters have quite diﬀerent implications
for the dispersion in Social Security payments among retirees. For ex-
ample, our simulation results indicate that with a guarantee of $0, the
person at the 10th percentile (ranked by the present value of lifetime earn-
ings) receives an annual Social Security payment of $6,405, in contrast to
ap a yment of $52,639 for the person at the 90th percentile. When the guar-
antee is increased to $20,000, this spread declines to $21,569 for the 10th
percentile, and to $32,896 for the 90th.
Figure 4.1 shows the averages over the 1,000 consumers of the simulated
130 Angus Deaton, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and Christina Paxsontrajectories of income (earnings prior to retirement and receipts from So-
cial Security after retirement), consumption, and cash on hand (earnings
plus assets excluding Social Security assets) for the four models all with G
seta t$5,000. These graphs are shown to demonstrate that the various
models do indeed generate standard life-cycle proﬁles. Earnings is the
same in each of the three graphs. Consumption is ﬂat over the life cycle in
the certainty equivalent case when borrowing is allowed, but rises in the
models with precautionary motives and borrowing constraints, and in the
quadratic case with borrowing constraints. Indeed, the quadratic case with
no borrowing (on the bottom left) and the isoelastic “impatient” case with
no borrowing (top left) generate similar proﬁles. With more patient (lower
)c o nsumers in the top right panel, there is more accumulation during
the working life, and assets prior to retirement are higher. The certainty
equivalent consumers in the bottom right panel have expectations of earn-
ings growth and so engage in substantial borrowing early in life but, even
so, have some net assets prior to retirement.
Figure 4.2 shows the average consumption proﬁles for the four diﬀerent
models (in the four panels, as before) and for the ﬁve diﬀerent Social Secu-
rity schemes (in each panel). To a ﬁrst approximation, and with the tax
rate held ﬁxed, the choice of system has no eﬀect on the lifetime proﬁle of
consumption. Figure 4.2 also shows more clearly than ﬁgure 4.1 the life-
time shape of consumption in the four models: Precautionary motives or
borrowing restrictions drive the increase in consumption over the working
period; in the top left panel, where impatience is greater than the interest
rate, consumption declines after retirement once all uncertainty is re-
solved. For the cases with precautionary motives or borrowing restrictions,
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Fig. 4.1 Age proﬁles of consumption, earnings (inclusive of transfers), and assets
for diﬀerent speciﬁcations, G 
 $5,000average consumption during retirement is somewhat higher in the regimes
with the higher minimum guarantee. This appears to be a consequence
of the borrowing constraints. Those consumers who draw poor earnings
throughout their lives, and who would like to borrow against their Social
Security but cannot, have higher consumption in retirement when the
guarantee becomes available. In eﬀect, such consumers are being forced
to save for higher consumption in retirement than they would choose if
left to themselves. Such eﬀects are absent in the pure certainty equivalent
case where borrowing is allowed.
Figure 4.3 plots the Gini coeﬃcients of consumption by age and shows
how consumption inequality evolves in the various models and for the
diﬀerent Social Security systems. The Gini coeﬃcients, together with inter-
quartile ranges of the logarithm of consumption, are given in numerical
form in table 4.1. In all of the models, consumption inequality is higher at
all ages the lower the Social Security guarantee (the higher the fraction of
taxes invested in personal accounts) and the more autarkic the system. A
higher guarantee with its associated lower limit to lifetime earnings causes
consumption inequality to be lower from the start of the life cycle, though
the early eﬀects are strongest in the pure certainty equivalent case, and
manifest themselves only later in life in the models with borrowing con-
straints. With a higher guarantee, and less in individual accounts, the sys-
tem has more sharing, so that individual earnings innovations have less
eﬀecto nc o nsumption because the good (or ill) fortune will be shared with
others. Although this sharing is implemented only after retirement, be-
cause consumption is smoothed over the life cycle, the eﬀecto ninequality
works at all ages to an extent determined by the assumptions about prefer-
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Fig. 4.2 Consumption proﬁles under diﬀerent speciﬁcations and alternative Social
Security rulesences, growth, and borrowing constraints. When borrowing constraints are
imposed in an environment with earnings growth, consumption smoothing
is inhibited, and the eﬀects of risk sharing on inequality are more apparent
in the later than in the earlier phases of the life cycle. These results are
not sensitive to the choice of inequality measure. The interquartile ranges,
although somewhat jumpier, display patterns that are similar to the Gini
coeﬃcients.
Figure 4.3 also shows a sharp drop in consumption inequality after re-
tirement, particularly when the guarantee in the Social Security system is
relatively large. Once again, this comes from the borrowing constraints
and the inability of lifetime unlucky consumers to borrow against the So-
cial Security system. These people have very low consumption immedi-
ately prior to retirement, which exaggerates inequality. The eﬀectv anishes
as Social Security becomes available and their consumption rises. In the
cases where the guarantee is large, there is also some decline in inequality
prior to retirement. Although no theoretical reason prohibits this, we have
nots of ar developed a convincing explanation of why it should occur.
Panel 1 of ﬁgure 4.3 also shows a small decline in consumption inequality
during retirement. This is due to the combination of borrowing constraints
and impatience (r  ). Unconstrained consumers choose declining con-
sumption paths during retirement (at a constant and common rate of
about 0.64 percent per year), while those who are constrained simply con-
sume their constant Social Security income. The result is a compression
of the distribution of consumption.
Social Security and Inequality over the Life Cycle 133




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Overall, the results in ﬁgure 4.3 and table 4.1 show that as we move
from one extreme to the other, from putting everything into individual ac-
countsandgivingnoguarantee(aSocialSecuritysystemthanconﬁnesitself
to compulsory saving) to a guaranteed ﬂoor of $20,000 with only one-
fourth of Social Security taxes going to personal accounts, the Gini co-
eﬃciento fco nsumption increases by between 5 and 6 percentage points on
average over the life cycle, less among the young, and more among the old.
This is a large increase, exceeding the increase in consumption inequality
in the United States during the inequality boom from the early to the mid-
1980s. For example, the Gini coeﬃciento ft o tal consumption for urban
households from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey rose from 0.37
in 1981 to 0.41 in 1986.
Table 4.2 shows “poverty rates” by age for the diﬀerent models and
Social Security systems. An individual is deﬁned as being in poverty if
annual consumption is less than $10,000. This poverty threshold was arbi-
trarily chosen, but it delivers total poverty rates that are not very diﬀerent
from those in the United States. For example, with G equal to $5,000, the
total poverty rate is 12.5 percent for the ﬁrst model. We are more con-
cerned with how poverty varies with age than with its level. The age pro-
ﬁles of poverty are similar for the ﬁrst three models, in which there are
borrowing constraints. Poverty rates decline up to retirement age: Con-
strained consumers are more likely to be poor when they are young, and
earnings are low. Poverty in retirement depends on the value of the Social
Security guarantee. When the guarantee is greater than or equal to the
poverty threshold, poverty in retirement must equal zero. For smaller val-
ues of the guarantee, the poverty rate in retirement is generally less than
during working years. However, in one case—that of isoelastic preferences
and r  —the poverty rate grows during retirement. In this case, impa-
tientc o nsumers reduce consumption over time, and increasingly fall below
the threshold.
Thef o urth model, with quadratic preferences and no borrowing con-
straints, yields very diﬀerent results. Poverty rates increase with age up to
retirement. Average consumption is constant over the life cycle, and the
increasing dispersion in consumption with age implies that consumers will
increasingly fall below the threshold. Increases in the poverty rate cease
at retirement. However, Social Security guarantees in excess of the poverty
threshold do not eliminate poverty, since (in this model) individuals are
free to borrow against the guarantee during working years. Higher Social
Security guarantees do, in fact, reduce poverty, but they do so at all ages,
by making lifetime wealth more equal across individuals.
Figure 4.4 compares our simulated patterns of inequality over the life
cycle with those calculated from the data in the CEX and reported in Dea-
tona nd Paxson (1994). By construction, the life-cycle proﬁle of simulated
earnings inequality is similar to the actual proﬁle. Simulated consumption
136 Angus Deaton, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and Christina PaxsonTable 4.2 Poverty Rates (fraction of age group with consumption less than
$10,000) with Diﬀerent Social Security Plans
G
Age $0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000
Isoelastic preferences, r 
 0.03, 
0.05
25 0.239 0.238 0.238 0.237 0.238
29 0.210 0.209 0.207 0.207 0.207
34 0.177 0.176 0.175 0.175 0.175
39 0.158 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153
44 0.146 0.140 0.143 0.142 0.139
49 0.133 0.127 0.127 0.128 0.128
54 0.120 0.115 0.116 0.117 0.117
59 0.119 0.104 0.103 0.106 0.105
64 0.119 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000
69 0.123 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000
74 0.134 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000
79 0.141 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000
84 0.144 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000
Isoelastic preferences, r 
 0.03, 
0.03
25 0.264 0.262 0.258 0.258 0.258
29 0.228 0.227 0.225 0.225 0.225
34 0.186 0.185 0.179 0.178 0.178
39 0.155 0.154 0.153 0.150 0.150
44 0.141 0.135 0.134 0.134 0.134
49 0.129 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.114
54 0.118 0.106 0.099 0.098 0.098
59 0.112 0.095 0.091 0.093 0.094
64 0.113 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000
69 0.113 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000
74 0.113 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000
79 0.113 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000
84 0.113 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000
Quadratic preferences, r 
 0.03, 
0.03
25 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195
29 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186
34 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163
39 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152
44 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149
49 0.144 0.141 0.138 0.139 0.139
54 0.138 0.129 0.125 0.125 0.126
59 0.147 0.126 0.118 0.123 0.124
64 0.135 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000
69 0.135 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000
74 0.135 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000
79 0.135 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000
84 0.135 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000
(continued)inequality (from the “impatient” isoelastic case) is too high relative to the
actuals; perhaps the borrowing restrictionsa re preventingc o nsumption
from being suﬃciently smoothed. Nevertheless, the upward drift of con-
sumption inequality is very much the same in the data as in the simula-
tions, which alsoshowtheeﬀectsoninequalityofthediﬀerentSocialSecur-
ity designs.
In ﬁgures 4.5 and 4.6 we turn to the life-cycle pattern of inequality in
assets, in ﬁgure 4.5 for assets excluding Social Security wealth, and in ﬁg-
ure 4.6 including Social Security wealth. The permanent income model is
excluded from these comparisons because average wealth is negative for
much of the life cycle. Total wealth at any given age is deﬁned as the sum
Table 4.2 (continued)
G
Age $0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000
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Quadratic preferences, r 
 0.03, 
0.03, no borrowing constraints
25 0.055 0.047 0.036 0.030 0.014
29 0.082 0.068 0.054 0.043 0.030
34 0.116 0.100 0.085 0.068 0.051
39 0.153 0.143 0.125 0.114 0.097
44 0.202 0.187 0.175 0.149 0.134
49 0.247 0.224 0.203 0.183 0.163
54 0.260 0.242 0.221 0.194 0.170
59 0.277 0.259 0.234 0.209 0.192
64 0.280 0.264 0.239 0.212 0.197
69 0.280 0.264 0.239 0.212 0.197
74 0.280 0.264 0.239 0.212 0.197
79 0.280 0.264 0.239 0.212 0.197
84 0.280 0.264 0.239 0.212 0.197
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Fig. 4.4 Actual and simulated inequality of earnings and consumptionof non–Social Security assets At and the present discounted value at t of
receiving G from retirement R to death T, plus the accumulated balance
in the personal saving account, if any. Making the Social Security system
more autarkic by holding the Social Security tax constant and devoting
more of the revenue to personal accounts and less to a universal guarantee
has the opposite eﬀecto ninequality of non–Social Security wealth than it
doeson the inequality of consumption. This is because of the substitutabil-
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Fig. 4.5 Gini coeﬃcients for assets, excluding Social Security assets
Fig. 4.6 Gini coeﬃcients for total assets, including Social Security assetsity between saving for retirement inside and outside the Social Security
system. If we examine the proﬁles of asset accumulation by age (not shown
here), average non–Social Security accumulations are larger the smaller is
the fraction of the Social Security tax invested in individual accounts.
There is a similar substitutability in asset inequality; when there is a large
Social Security ﬂoor for everyone, the resulting equality is partially oﬀset
by inequality in private accumulation.
The diﬀerent patterns of asset inequality for the quadratic case in the
bottom left panel, as opposed to the isoelastic cases in the top panels,
are associated with the fact that a substantial fraction of the quadratic
consumers are credit constrained up until around age forty, so that inequal-
ityi sh igha te a rly ages because so many consumers have exactly nothing.
The oﬀsetting of private wealth against Social Security wealth only shows
up once the majority of consumers are accumulating private assets, at
whichpoint they are no longer credit constrained. In the cases with isoelas-
tic preferences, the borrowing constraints are binding for only a small frac-
tion of young consumers; the variability of earnings and the convexity of
marginal utility is enough to overcome impatience and the expected
growth of earnings.
When we come to ﬁgure 4.6, which shows the inequality of all assets,
we see the “standard” pattern restored; the more autarkic the system and
the larger the fraction of Social Security taxes devoted to private accounts,
the larger is the inequality of assets. Note that the Gini coeﬃcients for all
assets are much lower than those for private assets; even with personal
accounts, the addition of Social Security to private wealth makes the dis-
tribution of wealth much more equal. As with consumption, asset inequal-
ityr ises with age, but does so most rapidly in the cases where insurance is
greatest, so that the diﬀerences in asset inequalities across the various
schemes diminish with age. Even so, the most autarkic systems are the
most unequal at all ages.
4.3.4 Social Security Design and Inequality:
Results with Variable Interest Rates
Ther e sults on asset inequality, and to a lesser extent those on consump-
tion inequality, are likely to be seriously aﬀected by our assumption that
everyone earns the same rate of return on their assets. Under some of the
early proposals for reform—for example, those from the largest group in
the Gramlich report—one of the great virtues of personal accounts was
seen as the freedom given to individual consumers to choose their own
portfolios. More recent proposals have tended to favor severe restrictions
on portfolio choice, perhaps restricting consumers to a limited menu of
approved funds, which themselves must adhere to strict portfolio rules.
Clearly, allowing diﬀerent people to obtain diﬀerent returns adds a new
source of inequality, in both assets and in consumption. If, for example,
the funds for the minimum guarantee G were invested in a common fund
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return for diﬀerent individuals, either because of their individual portfolio
choices or because of diﬀerential management fees, then a move to per-
sonal accounts can be expected to increase inequality by more than in the
calculations presented thus far. Alternatively, if the limited menu of funds
oﬀered diﬀerent risk-return tradeoﬀs, and if high earners chose higher re-
turns because they are less risk averse, the availability of the menu would
likely translate into higher consumption inequality.
It is not obvious how to construct a model with diﬀerential asset returns
that is both realistic and computationally tractable. We have so far consid-
ered only one simple case. Personal accounts are invested in one of eleven
mutual funds, and consumers must choose among them at the outset of
the working life. The eleven mutual funds have rates of return from 2.5 to
3.5 percent per year. One can think of the funds as having identical (Stan-
dard & Poor’s 500) portfolios, but management fees range from zero to 1
percentage point; the equilibrium is maintained by diﬀerential advertising
and reporting services. We allocate our 1,000 consumers randomly to the
eleven mutual funds, with equal probability of receiving any one interest
rate; this is a conservative procedure, and inequality would presumably be
higher if those with higher earnings were more ﬁnancially sophisticated
and systematically chose the no-load funds. We assume that consumers
are forced toc o n v ert their retirement accounts into annuities at retirement
(using the interest rate to which they have been assigned), and also that
the Social Security system gives each consumer a guaranteed amount of
$5,000 per year after retirement in addition to the annuity.
Ther e sults indicate that there is virtually no increase in consumption
inequality before retirement, and very little after retirement, associated
with assigning diﬀerent consumers to diﬀerent ﬁxed interest rates. The top
panel of ﬁgure 4.7 shows the Gini coeﬃcientf or consumption for the cases
described above, with dispersion in interest rates, and the case in which all
consumers receive the same interest rate of 3.0 percent. This result may
notb en ot surprising, considering that most saving (whether private or
through the Social Security system) is done late in life, when income is
high, so that those that receive lower interest rates do not have wealth at
retirement that is much lower than those with higher interest rates. Con-
sider, for example, a group of 1,000 consumers whose incomes follow the
process described above, each of whom pays 12.4 percent in taxes, 81 per-
cent of whichi sallocated to private Social Security accounts (thereby gen-
erating enough government revenue to funda$5,000 guaranteed payment
to each during retirement). If each member of the group receives an inter-
estr ateo f2.5 percent, the average private Social Security account balance
upon retirement will equal $278,597. This number will be 22.4 percent
higher, or $341,014, with an interest rate of 3.5 percent. The percentage
diﬀerence in total retirement wealth, including the equalizing guarantee of
$5,000 per year, is even smaller, and the diﬀerence in average consumption
Social Security and Inequality over the Life Cycle 141in the ﬁrst year of retirement for the two interest rates is less than $5,000.
This diﬀerence is for a spread of one full percentage point; in the exercise
conducted above, most consumers have interest rates between the ex-
tremes, so there is even less of an eﬀecto no verall inequality.
Even with a much wider spread of returns, there is only a modest eﬀect
on inequality. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 4.7 shows the case in which
consumers are distributed over (ﬁxed) rates of return from 1 percent to 7
percent, compared with the case in which all get 4 percent. This can be
thought of as the case in which consumers make a choice between equities
and bonds at the beginning of their working careers and may never change
thereafter. Because the spread is wider, there is more inequality than be-
fore, but the eﬀects are modest compared with the other issues examined
in this chapter.
It is important to note that assigning consumers to diﬀerent but ﬁxed
rates of interest will not necessarily have the same aﬀects as allowing the
interest rate to vary randomly over time for individual consumers. In fu-
ture work, we plan to examine how interest rate risk, as opposed to interest
rate dispersion, aﬀects inequality.
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Comment James M. Poterba
This is an innovative and important chapter that provides new evidence
on how Social Security programs aﬀect the distribution of lifetime re-
sources. The chapter presents an elegant analytical treatment of the issues
surrounding lifetime inequality and retirement transfer programs. It con-
siders how a somewhat stylized version of the current U.S. Social Security
system would aﬀect the degree of inequality in lifetime consumption, and
it also explores how a shift toward an individual accounts Social Security
system might aﬀect inequality. The chapter provides a very useful starting
point for analyzing more complex Social Security arrangements, and many
of my comments will focus on potential directions for such extensions.
One very attractive feature of the analysis is the presentation of both Gini
coeﬃcients for consumption inequality as well as summary statistics for
the fraction of the population at diﬀerent ages that has consumption below
a “poverty line” level.
The chapter begins with an elegant treatment of how a simple Social
Security system would aﬀect the inequality of consumption, saving, and
assets in a stylized economy. The analysis begins with a very general in-
sight. A Social Security system that taxes each worker’s earnings at a ﬁxed
James M. Poterba is the Mitsui Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and both a research associate of and director of the public economics research
program at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Social Security and Inequality over the Life Cycle 143rate, and then pays each worker a beneﬁt that is tied to the average earn-
ings level in the population, reduces the variance of consumption and of
net-of-tax incomes. If inﬁnitely lived consumers populate the economy,
and these consumers save in accordance with the life-cycle hypothesis,
then it is possible to derive analytical results for the steady-state variance
of consumption with and without the simpliﬁed Social Security system.
While the insights from such a model are quite general, the numerical
results may fail to describe the impact of actual Social Security programs
fort wo reasons. First, actual Social Security systems do not tax all workers
at the same rate, and transfer back a ﬁxed share of economy-wide income.
Taxable earnings are often subject to limits, and beneﬁt formulae often
incorporate progressive elements that transfer larger amounts, per dollar
of taxes paid, to low- than to high-earning individuals. Such programmatic
details would be straightforward to incorporate in a somewhat more de-
tailed model of lifetime income and consumption inequality.
The second diﬃculty with the stylized model in the ﬁrst part of the
chapter is that a substantial body of empirical evidence suggests that many
households do not behave in accordance with the simple life-cycle hypoth-
esis. This concern motivates the second part of the chapter, which uses a
richer model of consumer behavior, incorporating precautionary motives
fors a ving, to estimate how current and modiﬁed Social Security programs
could aﬀectc o nsumption inequality. The chapter is careful to consider
several diﬀerent speciﬁcations of preferences and to illustrate the sensitiv-
ityo fk ey ﬁndings to various assumptions. Ther esults are presented both
in terms of standard inequality measures, such as the Gini coeﬃcient, and
by calculating the fraction of households who experience consumption lev-
els below a prespeciﬁed threshold.
The chapter yields several ﬁndings of broad interest and importance.
First, Social Security systems that levy taxes on realized earnings, but pro-
vide beneﬁts that depend in part on aggregate earnings, typically reduce
the inequality of lifetime consumption. The current deﬁned beneﬁt (DB)
system in the United States has some elements of such a system. Programs
of this type reduce inequality in consumption both before and after retire-
ment, and they can have a particularly large impact on the inequality of
postretirement consumption when there is a large “guarantee level” that
provides a consumption ﬂoor for Social Security recipients. With such a
guarantee, many households will choose not to save at all for retirement,
instead relying on the guarantee level to provide their retirement con-
sumption.
Second, shifting from a DB Social Security system with a guaranteed
beneﬁt ﬂoor to a system of individual accounts will increase consumption
inequality both before and after retirement. The postretirement increase
in inequality arises largely from the greater link between preretirement
earnings and postretirement resources in individual accounts rather than
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sumption inequality results in part from the saving adjustments that indi-
viduals make in response to the shifting Social Security system. Even if
the share of earnings devoted to individual accounts was the same as the
share collected by the taxes that ﬁnance a DB pension plan, there could
be endogenous changes in the saving behavior of individuals and in the
resulting pattern of preretirement consumption. This is an important in-
sight, and one that must be considered in future studies of Social Security
and inequality.
Third, the numerical results suggest that allowing for diﬀerences in the
rates of return earned by diﬀerent individuals within an individual ac-
counts system has a relatively modest impact on the inequality of lifetime
consumption. This result seems surprising at ﬁrst, since one would imagine
that greater return variability would result in greater variability of postre-
tirement consumption. While variable rates of return work in this direc-
tion, they haveam odest eﬀect because most retirement saving is done in
the few years before retirement, so the period of time over which diﬀer-
encesi nr eturns compound is relatively short. The modest incremental in-
crease in consumption inequality is also, to some extent, a reﬂection of the
very substantial degree of inequality in lifetime income, which translates
into heterogeneity in postretirement consumption.
The chapter represents an important start on the very substantial task
of modeling how public policies such as Social Security may aﬀect con-
sumption inequality. There are many productive directions in which the
current analysis could be extended, however, to provide more information
on what might actually happen in a personal accounts retirement system.
Ther e mainder of this comment outlines several such directions.
One natural extension is to allow for possible correlation between the
rate of return that investors earn on their individual accounts and the level
of their lifetime income. There is some evidence from 401(k)-type plans,
reported in Poterba and Wise (1998), that higher-income households tend
to hold a higher fraction of their 401(k) balances in stocks rather than
bonds. Since stocks have historically provided investors with a higher re-
turn than bonds, this raises the prospect that those with higher incomes
may earn better returns on their individual accounts, on average. Such a
correlation would magnify the degree of inequality in retirement resources.
It might be particularly important if individuals choose focal values in
their asset allocation, such as 0, 50, or 100 percent stock.
As econdp otentially useful extension would recognize the potential
feedback from the Social Security system to the structure of pretax earn-
ings. The current analysis treats the pretax income distribution as given.
Yet Social Security systems that tax individuals on their earnings, and
return to them a fraction of the economy-wide average earnings at some
future date, have incentive eﬀects similar to those of more standard indi-
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ognized as having diﬀerent incentive eﬀects than individual accounts sys-
tems in which individuals can invest a fraction of their earnings, then it is
possible that labor supply would be diﬀerent under the two systems. If
higher tax rates generally discourage labor supply, then one would expect
am orec ompressed distribution of pretax incomes in the DB case than in
the individual accounts case. More generally, the possibility that diﬀerent
Social Security systems have diﬀerent levels of deadweight loss raises a
host of additional issues for analysis, because policies that change the dis-
tribution of resources and aﬀectc o nsumption inequality would also aﬀect
the aggregate pool of resources.
A third potential extension would be to recognize that Social Security
beneﬁts are typically paid to two members of a household, because both
husbands and wives are eligible to receive beneﬁts. Recent work by Gust-
man and Steinmeier (1999) suggests that a very substantial part of the re-
distribution that the current Social Security program carries out on an
individual basis is undone when one considers redistribution across house-
holds. The households with higher lifetime incomes often have secondary
earners who receive net beneﬁts with larger present discounted values (in
relative terms) than the secondary earners in lower-income couples. Some
of this eﬀect operates through diﬀerential mortality of secondary earners
in diﬀerent types of households, and some operates through diﬀerences in
lifetime earning histories. The central message of this work is that consid-
ering couples rather than individuals is a key step for analyzing Social
Security policies. The framework developed in this paper could be ex-
tended to consider marriage and to create households with two earnings
streams.
Af o urth, and particularly ambitious, extension of the current work
would involve using actual earnings histories rather than simulated earn-
ings histories to evaluate Social Security redistribution. There is undoubt-
edly more information in the history of actual earnings processes than in
the stylized set of earnings histories generated by the stochastic models in
the present chapter. Actual earnings histories are increasingly available
forr esearch purposes—for example, in conjunction with the Health and
Retirement Survey. It would be intriguing to learn whether the patterns of
consumption inequality that emerge in the current analysis are broadly
conﬁrmed if the analysis is based on actual earnings experience.
The authors of the present chapter have tackled one of the central issues
in the analysis of Social Security reform. There is little doubt that substan-
tive discussions of Social Security reform in the political arena will turn
noto nly on distributional issues across generations, which have received
much attention in the academic literature, but also on how reform will
aﬀect the distribution of resources within cohorts. This chapter provides a
very valuable set of insights for addressing within-cohort redistribution,
and it is sure to stimulate further work.
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Discussion Summary
Martin Feldstein asked about the relative importance of the timing of con-
tributions, because those who contributed early would get the advantage
of more yearso fc ompound interest. The authors explained that with high
wage growth, most income occurs at the end of the life cycle. Conse-
quently, almost all contributions are made at the end of the life cycle, and
the impact of compound interest is negligible. The more signiﬁcant factor
is inequality in earnings, not timing of contributions.
John B. Shoven felt that it was important to examine inequality of oppor-
tunities, but not necessarily inequality of outcomes. If people are informed
and given a broader menu, then the extra choice allows people to max-
imize their utility better: It should not be argued that increased choice is
terrible because it increases inequality. The authors responded with two
points. First, most of the inequality comes from earnings inequality, which
is not really chosen in this model. Second, society seems to be concerned
about choices that are made voluntarily, but are very bad decisions ex post.
For instance, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA-CREF)
has increased the choices, but has limited those choices in some ways be-
cause it is worried about people’s voluntarily choosing to become very
poor.
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ indicated that the traditional life-cycle picture,
high nonasset income followed by lower nonasset income during retire-
ment, does not seem to correspond with data in the United States. If Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are part of net nonasset income, cohorts
going through the life cycle now have net nonasset income that rises
through retirement. The number of people in old age who are borrowing
constrained seems to be important. Hence, an accurate proﬁle of net non-
asset income is vital to examining this issue. In addition, if Social Security
is actuarially unfair, then the ceiling on taxable earnings implies that the
lower-income classes are aﬀected more severely by this unfairness. Very
wealthy people have avoided most of the actuarial penalties of Social Se-
curity, and their consumption will be proportionately higher when com-
paredt oeveryone else. In this situation, Social Security might actually
Social Security and Inequality over the Life Cycle 147increase consumption inequality. The authors acknowledged the second
observation, but said it would be diﬃcult to build an earnings ceiling into
their model for various technical reasons.
Alan Gustman mentioned that when redistribution is examined by fam-
ily, about half of the redistribution in the current system disappears. The
amount of redistribution within the family depends on the number of years
workedb ythe spouse. While he could understand the diﬃculties pre-
venting the inclusion of these factors in the model, Gustman believed that
al arge amount of risk sharing and redistribution occurs between family
members.
148 Angus Deaton, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and Christina Paxson